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Abstract
I use variation in state EITCs between 1997-2005 to identify changes in informal
and regular labor supply by unmarried men and women with children. Men’s participa-
tion in the informal sector declines by 6 percentage points if a state EITC increases by
10% of the federal credit. Usual regular-sector hours worked per week increase by 4.1
and informal-sector hours per week fall by 2.7 with no eﬀect on total hours. Single men
with children appear to respond to state EITCs on the intensive rather than extensive
margin and shift away from informal work toward regular work without changing total
labor supplied. I ﬁnd no eﬀects on women’s participation in either regular or informal
work.
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1 Introduction
Estimates indicate that the magnitude of the informal economy in the United States was
between 7 and 10 percent of oﬃcial gross national product during the late 1990s and early
2000s.1. Cross-country studies suggest that higher tax and social security burdens lead to
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1the growth of informal activities (Schneider and Enste 2000). However, due to the lack of
survey data on participation in the informal sector, there is relatively little empirical work
on the eﬀect of tax rates on participation in the informal labor market. This paper examines
how low-income urban men and women in the United States alter their regular and informal
labor supply in response to tax credits.
The informal sector is often deﬁned as consisting of both illegal activity and business
activities that are not inherently unlawful but operate outside tax and regulatory systems.
One consequence of a large informal sector is lost tax revenue: the IRS estimated the federal
tax gap due to nonﬁling or underreporting of individual income at $222 billion in 2001
(Internal Revenue Service 2009). But when governments oﬀer tax credits, workers in the
informal sector forego beneﬁts by failing to report their income. In the United States, low-
income workers in industries in which informal suppliers provide a signiﬁcant fraction of the
labor force, such as domestic services, lawn and garden maintenance, home repairs, machine
operators, and farm and construction workers (McCrohan, Smith and Adams 1991, Marcelli,
Pastor and Joassart-Marcelli 1999), forego tax beneﬁts such as the earned income tax credit
(EITC) when they do not report income.
Because earned income tax credits subsidize regular work, they may induce low-income
workers to shift from informal to regular employment. Although these sectoral changes and
increased income reporting could increase EITC program expenditures, there are some ad-
vantages to encouraging more reporting of informal work. First, the EITC is a powerful
poverty-reduction program (Eissa and Hoynes 2006). Additionally, better reporting would
result in better measures of economic performance that could yield more targeted macroe-
conomic and social policy. By reporting income and paying in payroll taxes on that income,
low-income individuals would gain increased access to the social welfare programs related to
the payroll tax. And since the majority of EITC claimants use paid preparers to ﬁle returns,
encouraging reporting might encourage them to keep better ﬁnancial records and to access
better ﬁnancial advice (Infranca 2008).
2I use variation in state earned income tax credits from 1997-2005 to estimate the eﬀect
of tax credits on labor force participation in both the regular and informal sectors among
low-income urban men and women with children. I take advantage of four waves of detailed
longitudinal data on participation and hours worked in the regular and informal sectors from
the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study. Participation rates in informal work among
survey respondents are high: over 30 percent of unmarried men and 15 percent of unmarried
women report working in the informal sector during most waves of the survey.
This paper contributes the ﬁrst estimates of the role of taxes on informal labor supply
using panel survey data. I ﬁnd that increasing a state’s refundable EITC by one percent of
the federal credit decreases men’s informal labor force participation in the informal sector by
0.6 percent and decreases hours worked per week in the informal sector by 0.27. Expanding
a state’s EITC does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect men’s regular labor force participation but it
increases average hours worked per week in the regular sector by 0.41. There is no signiﬁcant
eﬀect on men’s total hours worked. Unmarried men appear to respond to EITC expansions
by engaging in more regular work and less informal work or by increasing their income
reporting without changing their total labor supply. For women, I ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect
of state EITCs on participation in either regular or informal work, but do ﬁnd that unmarried
women reduce their regular-sector and total hours in response to increases in state EITCs.
These results contrast with the existing literature on labor supply and the EITC, which
has generally focused on single women with children and found that they increase labor force
participation in response to the EITC but do not respond on the intensive margin. Men may
be more likely than women to respond to the EITC by changing their sectoral choice or their
reporting instead of their participation or total labor supply because men’s regular-sector
labor force participation rates are already higher than women’s: in national data, the male
and female labor force participation rates were 73.3 percent and 59.0 percent respectively
in 2005 and I observe similar rates in the Fragile Families data (Toossi 2006). The lack
of a participation eﬀect on regular labor force participation for women in this sample may
3occur because the large expansions in women’s labor force participation during the 1990s in
response to the federal EITC mean that fewer women remain on the participation margin,
so that additional state EITC increases may not have the same impact as earlier EITC
expansions.
2 Fragile Families’ Participation in the Informal Econ-
omy
Although a number of studies have used macroeconomic data to estimate the overall size
of the informal economy, national surveys generally have not collected data on the rate
of participation in informal work.2 O’Neill (1983) used data from the Current Population
Survey to estimate that 27.1 percent of men and 13.5 percent of women worked in the informal
sector, but his approach assumes that total labor force participation remains constant and
that changes in oﬃcial statistics reﬂect changes in informal participation. Several small-
scale, location-speciﬁc surveys do provide direct measures of participation in informal work.
Lemieux, Fortin and Frechette (1994) survey Quebec City workers and report underground
sector participation rates were 8.5 percent overall and 23.3 percent for men aged 18-24. Edin
and Lein (1997) ﬁnd that 39 percent of welfare-reliant mothers and 28 percent of wage-reliant
mothers engaged in supplemental unreported work.
The Fragile Families data is unique in that it is a large-scale, longitudinal survey that
asks detailed questions about informal economy participation. This survey followed mothers
and fathers of babies born in large U.S. cities for ﬁve years after the child’s birth and includes
information on regular work, work oﬀ the books, in respondents’ own businesses, and illegal
activities at four time periods. The Fragile Families data is constructed as follows: a total of
4898 hospital births occurring between 1998-2000 in twenty US cities with populations of over
2See Frey and Schneider (2001) for a review of methods used to estimate the size of the informal economy
using macroeconomic data.
4200,000 were sampled and separate mother and father interviews were obtained at birth and
at the child’s ﬁrst, third, and ﬁfth birthdays. Baseline interviews took place in diﬀerent years
in diﬀerent cities and the resulting data spans tax years 1997-2005. Non-marital births were
oversampled relative to marital births: approximately 75 percent of births in the sample were
non-marital. For detailed information about the sampling scheme, see Reichman, Teitler,
Garﬁnkel and McLanahan (2001).
As a result of this sampling scheme, the respondents are disproportionately low-income
and minority relative to the U.S. population at large and all are parents. Because the sample
is based on births, all survey respondents are parents. Parents’ connections to the under-
ground economy may be diﬀerent than those of individuals without children: for example,
their sectoral choice might be aﬀected by child support enforcement or they may want to
set an example for their child. When weighted to account for oversampling of non-marital
births, mothers’ data is representative of births occurring in U.S. cities populations over
200,000. Fathers’ data is not nationally representative. Although births were sampled ran-
domly within hospitals, whether a father interview was obtained for the birth depended in
part on the strength of his relationship with the mother. Fathers who had stronger relation-
ships with the birth mother were more likely to visit the hospital during or after the birth and
to participate in an interview so men in the sample have stronger family attachments than
men who did not participate. Consequently, although the results of this study provide useful
information about informal work and responses to the EITC among a relevant population,
they cannot be interpreted as indicative of the average response for the U.S. population as
a whole. However, despite the limitations on generalizing the results of studies using Fragile
Families data to all EITC-eligible workers, the Fragile Families survey’s extensive data on
informal economy participation across the United States allows for the ﬁrst large-scale study
of the role of taxes on informal work using panel survey data.
Most deﬁnitions of the informal economy include both illegal activity and legal activities
that are not reported to tax or regulatory authorities. The Fragile Families survey attempts
5to capture both types of activities. In each of the four waves of the survey, respondents
report whether they worked in a job for which they received a regular paycheck and report
their earnings, weeks worked per year, and average hours worked per week for regular work.
Then they are asked whether they participated in oﬀ-the-books work; worked in their own
business; engaged in drug sales, prostitution, or other “hustles”; or did other work for cash.3
In the last wave, respondents were not asked about oﬀ-the-books work but were asked about
the other categories of informal work. Fewer respondents report informal work in this wave,
most likely because the survey did not ask about oﬀ-the-books work.
Table 1 shows participation rates in the diﬀerent types of underground work. Men in the
Fragile Families data are more likely to report participating in informal work than women,
with participation rates ranging from 20 to 37 percent across waves for men and from 12 to
16 percent for women. Most reported informal work consists of unreported work rather than
inherently illegal activity: self-reported rates of criminal activities are low. Average informal
earnings for men are more than double the average informal earnings reported by women.
Since the average hours worked informally for men and women is similar, the diﬀerence
in earnings suggests that informal-sector wages are higher for men than for women in this
sample.4 Men are also signiﬁcantly more likely to work in the regular sector: 70 percent
of single fathers work in the regular sector in wave 4 compared to only 59 percent of single
mothers.
Using survey data on informal work is challenging because respondents may not be truth-
ful when asked about participation in illegal or informal work. They may fear that their
illegal activities will be reported to authorities. There is no way to know the extent of un-
3Survey professionals instructed respondents to include regular income from self-employment or their own
business as regular-sector work. The questions about the four types of informal work were prefaced with
this statement: “We are interested in ﬁnding out about some ways, other than regular work, in which people
make money. This kind of activity may be paid for in cash, or done in exchange for meals, or clothing, a
place to live, or something else.”
4Respondents report usual hours worked per week for each type of informal work. I use the sum of hours
worked in all types of informal work as the number of hours worked per week in the informal sector. An
alternative would be to use annual hours worked calculated from usual hours worked each week and weeks
worked per year. This increases measurement error because both hours worked and weeks work will likely
be measured with error.
6derreporting, but the participation rates in Fragile Families are similar to those estimated
by O’Neill (1983). Since the primary focus of the Fragile Families study is family dynam-
ics the majority of questions in the survey focus on relationship histories and beliefs about
child-rearing. By de-emphasizing the importance of income and employment, the survey
may encourage truthful responses.
3 EITCs and Work Incentives in the Regular and In-
formal Sectors
This paper uses variation in state earned income tax credits to identify the eﬀect of tax rates
on informal economy participation. State EITCs are typically designed as a percentage of the
federal EITC and can be used to oﬀset state tax liabilities. The federal EITC was designed
to reward work and is currently the largest cash transfer program for low-income families.
The federal credit (and consequently any state credit based on it) is characterized by (1) a
phase-in region in which earned income is low and only part of the credit may be claimed; (2)
a plateau region of earned income in which taxpayers can claim the maximum credit; and (3)
the phase-out region in which the amount of the credit that may be claimed decreases with
income. Because the federal credit is refundable, the credit claimed may be greater than the
tax liability, resulting in a refund. Not all state EITCs are refundable. The federal EITC
was introduced in 1975 and was expanded over time with the most recent major expansion
introduced by the 1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, which increased maximum
credit levels and extended the EITC to childless workers in 1994. From tax years 1996-2008,
the federal EITC phased in at rates of 7.65, 34, and 40 percent for taxpayers with no children,
one child, and two or more children respectively. Phase-out rates also stayed constant at
7.65, 15.98, and 21.06 percent.
Federal EITC beneﬁts depend on whether ﬁlers claim zero, one, or two or more qualifying
children under age 19, and because state EITCs function as a percentage of the federal credit,
7they expand the diﬀerences in combined state and federal credit size depending on number
of children claimed. Eligible qualifying children must have valid taxpayer identiﬁcation
numbers, live with the tax ﬁler at least half the year, and not be claimed by another ﬁler.
Children, step-children, adopted children, and their descendants, and in some cases siblings
or step-siblings and their descendants, can count as children. The residency requirement is
the key test for eligibility.
In a standard labor supply model in which an unmarried individual decides whether
and how much to work, the EITC unambiguously increases labor force participation: any
taxpayer who worked before is still better oﬀ working and some who did not work before
will be induced to work. Empirical work has generally found relatively large eﬀects of
the EITC on single mothers’ labor force participation (Eissa and Liebman 1996, Meyer
and Rosenbaum 2000, Ellwood 2000, Grogger 2003, Hotz, Mullin and Scholz 2006). The
predicted eﬀects of the EITC on hours worked depend on the region of the credit. In
the phase-in region, the theoretical eﬀect on hours worked is ambiguous due to oﬀsetting
income and substitution eﬀects. In the plateau region, the pure income eﬀect unambigously
decreases optimal hours worked. In the phase-out region, income and substitution eﬀects
both discourage work. Although most EITC recipients’ income places them in the plateau
or phaseout region of the credit, past empirical studies have generally found no eﬀects of the
EITC on hours worked; see Meyer (2010) for a summary of the literature.
The standard EITC labor supply model described above focuses on single taxpayers
and ignores household labor supply issues. (See Eissa and Hoynes (2004) for an analysis
of EITC eﬀects on married couples’ labor supply.) The frequency of cohabitation in the
Fragile Families data makes ignoring household labor supply considerations unrealistic even
for unmarried taxpayers: by the fourth wave of the survey, 63 percent of never-married
fathers and 72 percent of mothers report cohabiting with a partner in at least one wave.
If only one parent is EITC-eligible and the credit increases, the return to their labor
force participation increases relative to that of the parent who is not eligible, resulting in a
8substitution eﬀect across workers as well as a household income eﬀect. There should be an
unambiguous increase in labor force participation among EITC-eligible parents, but we could
also expect a decrease in labor supply among the non-eligible partners. If both parents are
already in the labor force, then the substitution eﬀects will depend on the recipient parent’s
income and the resulting region of the credit. If there are multiple children in the household
or if both parents are EITC-eligible, the possibilities are numerous as the children may be
split among the parents for EITC purposes. Prior to 2002, only the individual with higher
adjusted gross income was eligible to claim the child if two taxpayers met the residency test
requiring children claimed for EITC purposes to live with the taxpayer for at least half the
year. In 2002, this “AGI tiebreaker rule” was simpliﬁed Instead of determining who is eligible
to claim the child, it is now used only to allocate the child in cases where two taxpayers fail
to coordinate and both claim the child. Under these rules, cohabiting unmarried parents
could split their EITC-eligible children across two tax returns. Regardless of whether parents
cohabit, they may bargain over who claims the child. Since parents can now substitute on
both the margin of who claims the child(ren) and whether/how much they work, predicting
the eﬀects of a change in EITC policy on cohabiting couples’ labor supply is diﬃcult. Other
factors may also aﬀect parents’ willingness to bargain over who claims the child for EITC
purposes, such as if the parents have diﬀerent propensities to spend refunded tax credits on
the child.
Now consider the choice of labor supply across the regular and informal sectors. Even
when modeling the labor supply decisions of a single taxpayer who does is not aﬀected by
joint labor supply considerations, expanding the standard labor supply model to include
two sectors makes the problem of how the EITC will aﬀect labor supply signiﬁcantly more
diﬃcult because individuals can now substitute either on the labor/leisure margin or the
sectoral margin.
Suppose that an individual must decide whether and how much to work in both the
regular and informal sectors. Labor income in the regular sector is taxed and income in
9the informal sector is not taxed if the income is not detected but is taxed and penalized
if detected. Working in the informal sector shields income from taxation but exposes the
agent to risk. Changes in the tax rate change both the relative wages in the two sectors
and (depending on the structure of the penalty for evaded tax) the risk associated with
the informal sector. Sandmo (1981) and Cowell (1985) demonstrate that when the sem-
inal Allingham-Sandmo-Yitzhaki model of tax evasion is extended in this way to include
endogenous labor supply in a taxed and untaxed sector, individuals’ ability to substitute
either on the labor/leisure margin or the sectoral margin means that, without restricting the
utility function by specifying the nature of risk aversion or the separability of the utility or
labor supply functions, it is impossible to sign the eﬀects of a tax change on sectoral labor
supply. Because the EITC’s phase-in and phase-out rates are simply adjustments to the
marginal tax rate in a particular income region, it is impossible to sign the eﬀects of changes
in the phase-in and phase-out rates in any model where it is impossible to sign the eﬀects of
marginal tax rates on hours worked in either sector or on total hours worked.
The ambiguity arises because the sign of the income eﬀect becomes ambiguous. The
income eﬀect in each sector depends on the tax evasion cost function, which in turn depends
on both regular and informal income and the risks and penalties associated with being caught
evading taxes via informal work. By switching sectors, agents can substitute across risk levels.
Agents can also still substitute between labor and leisure. The ability to substitute along
two margins means that the income eﬀect is no longer ambiguously positive even when we
assume that leisure is normal. Popular wisdom suggests that informal work increases when
tax rates rise, but economic theory oﬀers no such clean-cut prediction, making empirical
research particularly useful.
Parents who can access both the informal and regular sectors and make household labor
supply decisions or bargain over who claims a child for EITC purposes can respond to policy
changes on the labor/leisure margin, the margin of who in the household works, the margin
of who claims the child, and the sectoral choice margin. In the face of this complexity,
10empirical estimate are our best hope for understanding how the EITC alters labor supply
in the informal and regular sector. To my knowledge, no previous research on the EITC
has estimated its impact on informal labor supply. This paper contributes estimates of the
EITC eﬀects on the informal work for both men and women and is also unusual in that it
estimates impacts on men’s regular-sector labor supply. The 2005 Statistics of Income data,
matched to Census records to obtain gender information, shows that 6 million single men
receive the EITC (3.4 million of whom claim qualifying children) and that the average EITC
for single men is $1,376 (see Table 2). Since single men receive approximately 20 percent of
EITC funds, examining the eﬀects of the EITC on men’s labor supply is worthwhile and it is
reasonable to expect that changes in the EITC would aﬀect low-income men’s labor supply,
particularly in a sample such as the Fragile Families data in which all men are fathers.
Several current policy initiatives have proposed expanding the childless EITC or oﬀering the
EITC to noncustodial parents. Better understanding how men respond to the current EITC
and how informal work substitutes for regular work would help policymakers evaluate those
initiatives.
4 Previous Empirical Studies on Tax Rates and Par-
ticipation in the Informal Economy
The lack of clear theoretical predictions about how changes in tax rates will aﬀect sectoral
choice makes empirical work very valuable. However, due to the lack of survey data on
oﬀ-the-books work, there are few empirical studies of the relationship between tax rates and
informal labor supply. Two studies from the early 1990s use a survey of workers in Quebec in
which jobs were classiﬁed based on whether they were reported to tax authorities. Lemieux
et al. (1994) ﬁnd a positive but insigniﬁcant eﬀect of marginal tax rates on underground
earnings after instrumenting for the tax rate and generally conclude that the tax system
does not signiﬁcantly alter sectoral choice decisions for the average worker. Lacroix and
11Fortin (1992) estimate a structural model of participation in the underground sector and
ﬁnd that an increase in the likelihood of audit and the penalty rate on detected evasion are
both associated with a small increase in hours in the regular sector and larger decrease in
hours in the untaxed sector. The elasticity of hours with respect to the tax rate suggests
that a higher tax rate increases hours worked in the untaxed sector.
Because there is very little microeconomic data on informal labor force participation, most
U.S. studies of the impact of tax rates on the informal economy have examined the eﬀect of
tax rates on reported income and have used tax compliance data or tax administrative data.
Clotfelter (1983) ﬁnds elasticities of underreported income with respect to the marginal tax
rate between 0.5 and 3.0 depending on the type of return, the measure of income, and the
income level. LaLumia (2009) examines the eﬀects of EITC phase-in and phase-out rates
on whether individuals report self-employment income. Using pooled cross sections of IRS
data, she ﬁnds that increasing the EITC phase-in rate increases the share of returns with
Schedule C self-employment income.
One prior study has attempted to use the Fragile Families survey data to examine the
relationship between tax rates and informal work. Rich and Kim (2001) use the ﬁrst wave of
the Fragile Families data to look at participation rates and hours worked in the underground
economy and ﬁnd negative but insigniﬁcant eﬀects of federal, state, and local tax rates on
participation in the underground. They use variation in state and local tax rates to identify
the eﬀect of taxes on labor supply but do not instrument for tax rates, and their estimates
are likely to suﬀer from endogeneity problems. Rich and Kim (2001) do ﬁnd that alcohol and
drug use are strongly associated with informal economy participation rates, suggesting that
barriers to regular-sector employment may be important determinants in informal-sector
participation.
To my knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study to use national longitudinal survey data to
examine the impact of tax rates on informal work. Additionally, this study provides some
of the ﬁrst estimates of labor supply responses of single men to the EITC. It is important to
12examine men’s and women’s labor supply response to the EITC separately because they have
diﬀerent access to the EITC, may diﬀer in their tendency to work informally and may have
diﬀerent abilities to shift between taxed and untaxed sectors in response to changes in the tax
rate. Additionally, low-income men are not eligible for many of the means-tested beneﬁts
available to single mothers. Understanding whether and how much men’s and women’s
informal and regular labor supply responds to tax changes will help us understand the
eﬀects of tax laws on real labor supply rather than only formal work or taxed income.
5 Identiﬁcation Strategy
To identify the eﬀect of the EITC on informal and regular sector labor supply, I begin with
a standard diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences speciﬁcation:
List = β(EITCratest)+Xistγ + Zstδ + μs + ηt +  ist,
where List is labor supply of individual i in state s in year t, EITCratest is the state EITC
in state s in year t as a percentage of the federal EITC, Xist is a vector of time-variant
individual characteristics, Zst is a vector of time-variant state characteristics, μs are state
ﬁxed eﬀects, ηt are year ﬁxed eﬀects. To take advantage of the Fragile Families panel data,
which contains up to four observations per individual, I estimate a ﬁxed eﬀects variation
of this speciﬁcation. The individual ﬁxed eﬀects capture unobserved time-invariant factors
such as aspects of taste for risk or access to the regular sector or informal sector.
The variation in state EITCs across states and over time provides the identifying vari-
ation. Between 1997-2005 (the tax years spanned by the Fragile Families survey data), 16
states introduced or changed earned income credits based on the federal credit, eﬀectively
altering the maximum credit and the phase-in and phase-out rates and providing exogenous
variation in EITC parameters. There is no variation in the federal EITC for single or head-
of-household ﬁlers during this time. Due to the selection process for the Fragile Families
13data, discussed above, not all states are represented in the Fragile Families sample. Of the
15 states at from which observations were drawn at baseline, six states modiﬁed their EITCs
during the 1997-2005 period, as summarized in Table 3.5
The key assumptions of the identiﬁcation strategy are that in the absence of changes in
state EITC policy there would be no diﬀerential changes in informal work and that states’
tendency to introduce an EITC is independent of the initial level of informal economic activ-
ity. Since diﬀerences in other state policies and in state labor market conditions could result
in diﬀerences across states, I control for state minimum wages and state monthly welfare
beneﬁt levels for a family of three. State minimum wages come from U.S. Department of
Labor Wages and Hours Division historical tables. State welfare beneﬁt level are from Ziliak
(2007); the welfare beneﬁt data is available online at Ziliak’s personal website. Although it
would be desirable to control for other aspects of state welfare systems such as diﬀerences
in time limits and work requirements, these measures do not vary suﬃciently in the data
both because most respondents live in one of 15 states and because all waves of the data
were collected after welfare reform so there is limited time variation in state policies. An
advantage of using the monetary beneﬁt levels is that because beneﬁt levels vary by state
but EITC income cutoﬀs do not, the point at which regular work is more attractive than
receiving transfers diﬀers across states. I also control for the state unemployment rate and
the state marginal tax bracket rate for a single tax ﬁler whose income lies just outside the
childless EITC credit region as a proxy for non-EITC features of the state income tax.6
Year dummies and an indicator for whether the person-year observation is from the post-
EGTRRA period after which federal marginal tax rates were lowered should account for
federal changes in federal policies aﬀecting low- and moderate-income households such as
changes in the refundability of the child tax credit and the 2001 tax bracket changes.
5Since fathers did not always live in the same states as mothers and since respondents moved over time,
most of the 50 states are represented in the full analysis.
6I calculate state bracket rates for childless single ﬁlers with income equal to the end of the phase-
out region (which ranges from $10,030 to $12,120)+$100 in each tax year using TaxSim, available at
http://www.nber.org/taxsim/ (Feenberg and Coutts 1993).
14At the individual level, I control for demographic characteristics including age and age
squared, education, cohabitation status, and number of children in the household. To control
for regular-sector job characteristics that aﬀect access to and attractiveness of the regular
economy, I include occupation codes for the most recent regular-sector job and regular-sector
hourly wages.7 I also include sex-speciﬁc measures of barriers to participation in the regular
labor market. For men, I include an indicator for whether the respondent has served jail time
and an indicator for whether the father is subject to a legal child support order. Jail time
may inhibit one’s ability to obtain or retain a regular job and strict child support regimes
may cause fathers to shift to underground employment to avoid enforcement, although Rich,
Garﬁnkel and Gao (2007) ﬁnd evidence that in cities with stronger enforcement, fathers work
fewer hours in the underground sector and there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in regular-sector
employment. For women, I include an indicator for whether they received TANF in the past
year because income cutoﬀs for welfare receipt may induce women to work informally.
Although ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions allow me to control for unobserved individual charac-
teristics, they do not accommodate limited dependent variables well. Since nearly one-third
of the men’s sample and one-half of the women’s sample does not work in the regular sector
and even fewer work in the informal sector, corner solutions are a serious matter in both sec-
tors. To address this, I estimate pooled probit regressions for the participation measures and
Tobit regressions for the hours worked measures in addition to the ﬁxed-eﬀects speciﬁcations.
As discussed above, the earned income credit has diﬀerent incentives depending on
whether an individual’s regular-sector taxable income places them in the phase-in, plateau,
or phase-out portion of the credit. My estimation strategy does not account for these dif-
ferent incentives for several reasons. First, examining diﬀerent eﬀects in diﬀerent regions of
the credit requires that I know which region of the credit is relevant, which requires knowing
7Respondents reported how much they earned in their most recent regular job, but could report their
earnings by hour, day, week, month, year, or other measure. I calculate hourly wages for all respondents and
trim the top and bottom 2 percent of the wage distribution to eliminate obvious coding errors. Respondents
who had not held a regular job were asked what the hourly wage would have to be for them to take a job; I
use this as their regular-sector wage.
15both taxable income and the number of children claimed for the credit. The Fragile Families
data does not allow me to measure taxable income, tax ﬁling status, and number of chil-
dren claimed with enough conﬁdence to identify the relevant credit region. Even with this
information, the endogeneity of earnings further complicates estimating separate eﬀects in
diﬀerent regions of the credit. Additionally, taxpayers may not understand the structure of
the credit well enough to respond to its kinks. Chetty and Saez (2009) ﬁnd that an H&R
Block experiment in which tax professionals explained the credit structure to taxpayers led
to large changes in labor supply, indicating that prior to the explanation taxpayers did not
understand the credit. Ethnographic research by Romich and Weisner (2000) suggests that
low-income taxpayers are aware of the credit but do not fully understand the phaseout fea-
tures. Instead, taxpayers interpret the EITC as linearly related to income, which is accurate
for workers with regular income in the phase-in region. For similar reasons, I ignore in-
centives to clump at kink points, although it should be noted that Saez (2010) ﬁnds strong
evidence of bunching around the kink between the phase-in and plateau regions of the EITC,
particularly among self-employed workers.
5.1 Sample Selection
I restrict my sample to men and women who were unmarried at baseline and remain un-
married for all subsequent waves. If these individuals ﬁle taxes, they should ﬁle as single or
head-of-household, and may claim qualifying children for the EITC legally only if they lived
with the children at least half the year and the children are not claimed as EITC-qualifying
children by another taxpayer. I estimate eﬀects for men and women separately because men
and women have very diﬀerent reported participation rates in the informal economy and
because single men are not eligible for most other welfare programs available to low-income
single women with children.8
8Female labor supply increases dramatically during the late 1990s; see, for example, Ellwood (2000) and
Grogger (2003). If low-income women work in the same jobs as low-income men, employment opportunities
for men might vary by state depending on welfare and EITC policy. Changes in women’s labor supply and
16I treat an individual as working in the informal sector if they report working in any of
the four categories of informal work: oﬀ-the-books work, work in their own business for
which they do not receive a regular paycheck, hustles and other illegal activities, and other
activities. Oﬀ-the-books work is closest to the conceptual measure in which I am interested
because it implies untaxed status but is likely to be similar to regular work in other ways. A
chief advantage of the combined measure of informal work is that it is less sensitive to whether
individuals change how they deﬁne their work from one wave to another. For example, if
a respondent paints houses for a fee, he may report this as oﬀ-the-books work in one wave
but as work in his own business in the next wave. Using only the oﬀ-the books measure
would record this as exiting the informal sector. Over 40 percent of men who report informal
work in two adjacent waves report diﬀerent types of underground work in diﬀerent waves.
In spite of the changes in how informal-sector work is reported, the results shown below are
very similar to the results when only the oﬀ-the-books measures is used. Respondents report
usual hours worked per week directly for regular work and each type of informal work. I use
the sum of hours worked in all types of informal work as the number of hours worked per
week in the informal sector.
Table 4 presents summary statistics in the last wave for the estimation sample of in-
dividuals who are unmarried at baseline and in all subsequent waves. The sample is dis-
proportionately minority and about one third of the sample does not have a high-school
education. Over half the men and 42 percent of the women are cohabiting with a partner.
Over one third of men have spent time in jail. Only 70 percent of single men in the last wave
worked in the regular sector in the past 12 months. Conditional on working, they worked
an average of 45.9 hours a week and 47.7 weeks per year. Service jobs, production/repair
jobs, and “handler/equipment cleaner/laborer” jobs are most common among, accounting
for 60 percent of workers. Among women, 59 percent worked in the regular sector in the last
wave and conditional on working they worked 40.7 hours per week and 45 weeks per year.
earnings might also change expectations for men to help support their partners and children. I ignore these
possibilities.
17Service and administrative support account for 63 percent of women’s occupations. The low
education levels and average household incomes indicate that many survey respondents will
be eligible for the EITC, so changes in EITC policy can be expected to impact behavior
among these respondents.
6R e s u l t s
6.1 Participation in the Informal and Regular Sectors: Extensive
Margin Results
Table 5 presents results from ﬁxed eﬀects regressions examining the eﬀect of refundable state
EITCs (measured as the percent of the federal EITC available as an additional credit) on the
decision to participate in informal work. After controlling for state policies and economic
conditions, demographics, and jail history and child support (for men) and welfare status
(for women), an increase in the state credit of 1 percent of the federal credit reduces men’s
likelihood of participating in the informal sector by 0.6 percentage points but does not appear
to aﬀect women’s participation.
The EITC coeﬃcient identiﬁes the eﬀect of increasing a state EITC by 1 percent of the
federal EITC. The dollar value of this policy change depends on the value of the federal
credit and number of children claimed. To translate these to dollar terms, if a state credit
increased from 0 to 10 percent of the federal credit in 2003, the maximum credit for ﬁlers with
no children would increase by $38, for one qualifying child by $255, and for two qualifying
children by $420, and this policy would decrease participation in the underground sector by
6 percentage points. As we might expect, men are less likely to work in the informal sector
when its returns are lower relative to the regular sector. Results are similar in magnitude and
signiﬁcance when state policy variables are excluded and when the state EITC is measured
using the non-refundable state percent of the federal credit. Although the dollar value of
this policy change to a particular individual is ambiguous, deﬁning the policy change in this
18way is relevant for program evaluation because most changes in state EITC policies involve
changes in the percentage of the federal credit that is available as a state credit.
Higher state unemployment rates are associated with lower levels of informal work for
both men and women. Informal work opportunities may decrease along with regular work
opportunities when the economy is weak. Interestingly, higher state taxes are associated
with lower informal labor force participation by women but not by men. Not surprisingly,
demographic characteristics play little role in determining underground economy participa-
tion in the ﬁxed-eﬀects model; most of the demographic measures change little over time.
Regular-sector wages do not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on informal economy participation.
This may be due to measurement error (because the regular-sector wage is calculated based
on total earnings and total hours for many respondents), because the regular sector wage
doesn’t vary suﬃciently over time to identify an eﬀect, or because individuals with higher
regular-sector wages also have higher informal-sector wages.
Table 6 shows the eﬀect of refundable state EITCs on regular-sector participation and on
participation in informal work conditional on participating in the regular sector. State EITCs
do not aﬀect men’s regular-sector labor force participation but, conditional on participating
in the regular sector, an increase in the state credit of 1 percent of the federal credit reduces
men’s likelihood of participating in the informal sector by 0.9 percentage points. Larger
eﬀects conditional on regular-sector participation may occur because individuals who only
work in the informal sector may be less responsive if they more likely to engage in illegal
rather than just informal work or they may prefer the informal sector for non-tax reasons.
Women’s participation in both the regular sector and the informal sector conditional on
regular-sector participation appear unresponsive to state EITCs. Mean marginal eﬀects from
pooled probit regressions (not shown) yield results very similar in magnitude and signiﬁcance
to the ﬁxed eﬀects results.
I do not ﬁnd the usual large positive eﬀect of EITCs on the regular-sector labor force
participation of women with children. All women in the Fragile Families study have children,
19so unlike most EITC studies, the identiﬁcation strategy does not compare labor force par-
ticipation for women with and without children. Cancian and Levinson (2006) ﬁnd no eﬀect
of the EITC on women’s regular labor force participation when comparing mothers with two
and three children, nor do they ﬁnd eﬀects when exploiting cross-state variation in EITC
subsidy rates. After the large increase in female labor supply during the 1990s, employment
rates of mothers have already increased so much that it may be diﬃcult for state EITCs to
have detectable eﬀects on the population of single mothers.
Higher minimum wages are associated with more participation in the informal sector
for men and lower informal-sector participation rates for women. This is consistent with
Neumark and Wascher (2007), who ﬁnd that higher minimum wages appear to reduce the
(regular-sector) wages of minority men and increase wages for minority women, particularly
when coupled with a large EITC. Spending time in jail reduces men’s regular-sector labor
force participation by 15.8 percent, while having a legal child support order makes them 5.4
percent more likely to work in the informal sector. As expected, mothers’ welfare receipt is
associated with lower rates of regular-sector labor force participation, but welfare receipt is
not signiﬁcantly associated with work in the informal sector.
The point estimates of the eﬀects of the state earned income credits on informal work
indicate negative eﬀects of state EITCs on men’s work in the informal sector (particularly
among men who work in the regular sector) but no signiﬁcant eﬀects on women’s informal
work. Although the conﬁdence intervals are wide, the men’s point estimates are large in
magnitude and indicate that a policy change that increases a state’s refundable EITC by 1
percent of the federal credit would lower men’s participation in the informal economy by 0.6
percent overall and by 0.9 percent among men who work in both sectors.
There are several reasons why we might expect large eﬀects of the EITC. First, state
EITCs might cause many individuals to switch from working oﬀ the books to reporting
their income, so much of the change may be a reporting response rather than a real change
in labor supply. The federal childless EITC oﬀsets the employee’s share of payroll taxes.
20Combined state and federal EITCs will more than oﬀset the employee’s share of payroll tax
contributions (although they will not fully oﬀset payroll taxes for the self-employed) and
the return to working on the books instead of under the table may be positive. If many
individuals are near the margin of working on or oﬀ the books, a small change in EITC rates
could result in large extensive-margin changes in informal work due simply to reporting
changes. Auerbach and Slemrod (1997) and Slemrod (1992) note that real responses are
low on the hierarchy of behavioral responses to taxation relative to timing responses and
accounting responses.
Second, previous research has found large eﬀects on female labor force participation,
indicating that EITC policies can have large labor supply eﬀects. Eissa and Liebman (1996)
ﬁnd that when the federal EITC increased from 11 to 14 percent, labor force participation of
women with children increased by 1.9 to 2.6 percentage points, indicating a relatively large
labor supply elasticity. Grogger’s (2003) estimates indicate that an increase of $1000 in the
federal EITC maximum increases female labor force participation by 3.6 percentage points.
Hotz et al. (2006) estimate that a $439 increase in the EITC for female-headed families with
two or more children corresponded to a 3.2 percentage point increase in (regular-sector)
employment. The large magnitude of men’s informal-sector responses to the EITC seems in
line with these estimates if we assume that men claim qualifying children when ﬁling for the
EITC (and consequently the monetary value of state EITC policies is relatively high).
As discussed above and shown in Table 2, 2005 Statistics of Income data show that 58
percent of single men receiving the EITC claimed at least one qualifying child. Since all men
in the Fragile Families dataset are fathers, even higher percentages of men in this sample
who claim the EITC may claim it with a child. Depending on the wave, between 54 and 70
percent of single men in the Fragile Families data report that the survey focal child lives with
them at least half the time, making them eligible for the EITC if the mother (or another
ﬁler) does not claim the child for EITC purposes. Men may also claim other children living
in their household for the EITC. After the ﬁrst wave, between 45 and 57 percent of men
21report children in their household at the time of the interview, and by the last wave men
report an average of 2.8 biological children. Consequently, it is likely that many of the men
in the sample who ﬁle for the EITC claim qualifying children. While generally men’s labor
supply is considered to be highly inelastic, which would make large EITC eﬀects surprising,
this is probably less true in this sample: there is high unemployment, approximately 17
percent of men work multiple regular-sector jobs, and men stop and start work throughout
the year.
Last, the large eﬀects may be due to the dual impact of the state EITC: it directly
increases the regular-sector wage and it also may also induce fathers to claim more children.
Claiming more children changes the relevant EITC phase-in rate, resulting in a large change
in the marginal tax rate in the regular sector and thus reinforcing the change in relative
wages. By changing the number of children they claim for EITC purposes, fathers can
choose their eﬀective tax rate (at a risk of IRS penalty). Liebman (1998) uses variation
in the value of claiming children caused by the Tax Reform Act of 1996 to estimate the
percent of EITC error that is due to intentionally claiming ineligible children and concludes
that a 45-percent increase in the maximum EITC increased the noncompliance rate due
to claiming ineligible children by 14 percent. McCubbin’s (2000) estimates indicate that
increasing the EITC by 10 percent would lead to a 4-percent increase in the probability of
claiming a child and a 14-percent increase in the dollar amount of EITC overclaims. Some
evidence suggests that men are more likely to claim ineligible children for EITC purposes
than women (Liebman 2000, Government Accountability Oﬃce 2004). Although law changes
and IRS enforcement eﬀorts introduced after these studies are likely to have decreased EITC
overclaims, state EITCs further incentivize claiming additional children for EITC purposes.
Do state EITCs encourage men to claim more EITC-qualifying children? We cannot
answer this directly using the Fragile Families data because it does not report the number of
children men claim for the EITC, but state EITCs may also make men more willing to live
in households with children. As shown in Table 7, in states with refundable EITCs, focal
22children are 4.6 percentage points more likely to live with their fathers more than half time,
although this does not increase with the size of the state credit. Mothers are also more likely
to report that the focal child lives with them at least half time when they live in states with
refundable EITCs.
Since individuals who can claim children beneﬁt more from state EITCs, we should expect
EITC claimants to have more children and be more likely to live with children than non-
claimants. The Fragile Families survey asks respondents whether they ﬁlled out or plan to
ﬁll out a federal tax return and, conditional on having ﬁlled out a return, whether they ﬁlled
out a form to claim the federal earned income tax credit. As shown in Table 8, men who
report ﬁling taxes have an average of 0.19 more children in the household, are 14.7 percent
more likely to have a child in their household, and are 14.9 percent more likely to report
that the focal child lives with them at least half time. The diﬀerences in number of children
in the household and probability of children in the household are larger for men who report
claiming the EITC. EITC claims appear sensitive to the presence of children, which indicates
that men are claiming children when ﬁling for the EITC and consequently it is reasonable
to expect labor supply responses consistent with large EITCs rather than the small labor
supply response we might expect if these men claimed only the childless EITC. Interestingly,
women who ﬁle taxes have fewer biological children and fewer children in the household on
average, although women who claim the EITC have an average of 0.23 more children in the
household. Women with more children may be less likely to work and may therefore be less
likely to ﬁle taxes.
The labor force participation response to state EITCs may have several components: (1)
real labor supply changes due to the direct change in the credit phase-in rate and resulting
marginal tax rate on regular-sector work introduced by the credit; (2) claiming responses in
which tax ﬁlers claim more children when state EITCs are a larger percent of the federal
credit and the return to claiming more children is higher, and then adjust their labor supply
to the new phase-in rates they have accessed through claiming additional children; and (3)
23reporting responses, in which individuals do not change the type or amount of labor they
supply but work on-the-books instead of oﬀ-the-books.
6.2 Hours Worked in the Informal and Regular Sectors: Intensive
Margin Results
We now turn to the eﬀect of state EITCs on hours worked by sector, shown in Table 9.
For men, ﬁxed-eﬀects speciﬁcations indicate that regular-sector hours increase by about 4.1
hours per week if a state increases their EITC by 10 percent of the federal credit. Men’s
informal-sector hours decrease by about by about 2.7 hours/week conditional on participation
in the regular sector. Since about 70 percent of the men in the sample already participate
in the regular sector, it is reasonable that we see eﬀects on the hours margin rather than
the participation margin. Results from pooled Tobits are similar, although smaller and less
signiﬁcant, than the ﬁxed eﬀects results. Total hours worked do not change signiﬁcantly
conditional on regular-sector participation. This suggests that much of the eﬀect on hours
worked represents a simple substitution between sectors or a change in reporting rather than
a real change in hours worked. If true, the EITC may not encourage work among low-
income men, but may change the type of work they do and may encourage reporting. This is
consistent with the large decline observed in informal-sector participation. For women, larger
state EITCs have a negative eﬀect on regular-sector labor supply and total hours (signiﬁcant
only in the Tobit speciﬁcations) but no eﬀect on informal-sector hours. In contrast to much
of the EITC literature, I ﬁnd an intensive-margin eﬀect but no extensive-margin eﬀect for
women’s regular labor supply.
The Tobit model used above imposes the econometric restriction that labor supply de-
terminants have the same eﬀect on both participation and on hours worked conditional on
entering the labor force. Given the ﬁxed costs of working and the barriers associated with
landing a job, the eﬀects of tax policy and other factors on hours worked may be quite
diﬀerent from the eﬀects on the decision to work. To relax the assumption that the eﬀect
24of the independent variables is the same on the intensive and extensive margins, I follow
Cragg’s (1971) proposal and estimate a probit in which the dependent variable is whether
an individual participates in work and then estimate a truncated OLS regression of hours
worked for both the regular and underground sectors. Results are shown in Table 10.
This results in slightly lower but still large and signiﬁcant eﬀects on men’s regular-sector
hours and a similar eﬀect for women’s regular hours compared to the Tobit results in Table
9. Once again, the results indicate that men in the Fragile Families sample respond to
the EITC by increasing hours in the regular sector and becoming less likely to participate
in the informal sector, while women decrease regular-sector hours worked. However, the
intensive-margin eﬀect on men’s informal-sector hours is no longer statistically signiﬁcant.
(The sample is restricted to observations for which both participation and hours are observed.
When the probit model of participation in the informal economy is run on the full sample,
the eﬀect is signiﬁcant.)
6.3 Some Additional Tests
Overall, state EITCs appear to decrease men’s participation in the informal sector and
to increase their regular-sector hours worked and decrease their informal hours worked. As
discussed above, many Fragile Families respondents cohabit with partners and all are parents.
Although I restrict my sample to unmarried individuals whose tax ﬁling status is single or
head-of-household so none are secondary earners for tax purposes, cohabiting partners will
choose their labor supply in conjunction with the labor supply decisions of their spouses.
When individuals can respond to tax policy changes on the labor-leisure margin, the sectoral
margin, and the margin of how work is distributed across household members, it becomes
increasingly diﬃcult to predict how labor supply will change in response to tax changes.
To examine whether the labor supply results above are driven by joint household labor
supply decisions, I restrict the estimation sample further to include (1) only person-year
observations in which the individual is single and not cohabiting in the current wave, and
25(2) only individuals who are single and not cohabiting in all waves. Results are shown in
Table 13. The general pattern of results holds when the ﬁrst restriction is imposed. State
EITCs continue to discourage informal-sector participation among men, especially when
conditioning on working in the regular sector. State EITCs reduce men’s hours worked in
the informal sector and increase hours worked in the regular sector but total hours do not
change signiﬁcantly. The men’s labor supply results do not appear to be driven by responses
speciﬁc to cohabitation. When the sample is restricted to those who have never cohabited
sample size falls dramatically and none of the men’s estimates are precise, although the
decrease in informal-sector hours remains similar in magnitude. Women do not appear to
respond to state EITCs on the participation margin in either sector. The negative eﬀect of
state EITCs on women’s work in the regular sector is not robust to varying cohabitation
status.
As Hotz et al. (2006) argue, in order for the estimated EITC eﬀects on male labor supply
to be plausible, we should see eﬀects of state EITC policy on men’s EITC claiming behavior.
The Fragile Families survey includes questions on whether the respondent ﬁled taxes and
claimed the EITC in the three waves after the baseline. Reassuringly, regressing an indicator
for whether the state has a state EITC in a particular year on men’s EITC claiming behavior
and the vector of controls shows that men are 9.3 percentage points more likely to claim
the EITC in the presence of an additional state EITC (see Table 12). However, this result
is sensitive to whether the indicator is deﬁned as whether a state has an EITC or whether
a state has a refundable EITC.9 Because Illinois is the only state in the Fragile Families
baseline sample that changed from a non-refundable to a refundable EITC, this means that
the results are sensitive to changes in claim rates in Illinois. EITC claiming rates were very
high in Illinois prior to the introduction of the refundable credit, which may be because
Illinois had extensive state outreach eﬀorts for EITC claiming both before and after the
Illinois EITC became refundable. Consequently, introducing a refundable EITC in Illinois
9The labor force participation and hours results are not sensitive to whether the regular or refundable
state EITC measure is used.
26seems not to have increased claim rates in the same way they were impacted in other states.
Using data from the IRS Statistics of Income tabulated by the Urban-Brookings Tax
Policy Center on the percent of tax ﬁlers who claim the federal EITC for each state from
1997-2007, I examine whether EITC returns increased overall when states introduced their
own EITCs. Simple ﬁxed eﬀects regressions on this data, in which the dependent variable is
the percent of federal tax returns with EITC claims in the state tax year and the independent
variable is whether the state had is own refundable EITC, indicate that EITC claims increase
by 0.4 percentage points when states introduce EITCs. (The larger magnitudes in the Fragile
Families data make sense because a higher percentage of Fragile Families respondents are
likely to be EITC-eligible than in the general population.) Although these regressions do
not control for other state characteristics, this evidence of a claiming response supports the
plausibility of labor supply responses.
One other concern is that because most observations are from the original 15 states in the
Fragile Families sampling scheme, I cannot take full advantage of the cross-state variation in
state EITCs. As a check, I restrict the sample to unmarried men living in the 15 states in the
birth sample and aggregate the labor-supply data into state-year cells. Table 13 shows the
results of regressing state EITC phase-in rates on labor force participation in both sectors.
The state-level results are consistent with the results using the individual-level data: higher
state EITCs lead to lower levels of participation in the informal sector, fewer hours worked
in the informal sector, and more hours worked in the regular sector.
7 Conclusions
I take advantage of changes in state earned income credits to identify changes in regular and
informal labor force participation by single men and women with children. In contrast to
the literature on EITC eﬀects for single mothers, I ﬁnd that the men adjust their regular-
27sector labor supply on the intensive rather than the extensive margin. Participation in the
informal sector appears to decline by 6 percentage points among urban, unmarried fathers
if a state increases its credit by 10% of the federal credit. Usual regular-sector hours worked
per week increase by 4.1 hours if the state increases its credit by 10% of the federal credit and
informal-sector hours per week fall by 2.7 hours with no signiﬁcant eﬀect on total hours. This
suggests that urban unmarried men with children respond to state EITCs by shifting away
from informal work toward regular work without changing total labor supplied. I ﬁnd no
eﬀects of state EITCs on participation of women with children in either regular or informal
work.
Recent policy proposals have called for the expansion of the EITC to noncustodial par-
ents, and the state of New York has already implemented such a program. My results suggest
that EITCs for noncustodial parents (the vast majority of whom are male) will not necessar-
ily increase male labor force participation but may provide a useful poverty reduction tool if
men report more income and receive larger EITCs. Expansions of the childless EITC have
also been proposed. Since all the men in the Fragile Families sample have children and are
many are likely to claim children for EITC purposes, this study cannot directly address the
eﬀects of expanding the childless credit, but the diﬀerences in men’s and women’s responses
indicate that an expansion of the childless EIT Cm i g h th a v es m a l l e rr e g u l a rl a b o rf o r c ep a r -
ticipation eﬀects than past program expansions that primarily aﬀected single women with
children. In light of these results, whether these proposed EITC expansions are useful de-
pends partly on whether policymakers’ primary goal is to change labor supply or to aﬀect
poverty. This study suggests that changing EITC policy has little eﬀect on men’s total labor
supply but does change the type of labor provided and whether income is reported.
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31Table 1: Fragile Families Respondents’ Participation in Informal and Regular Employment
Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4
Single Men (n=2019) (n=1680) (n=1617) (n=1547)
Participation Rates in Regular Sector 73.0 69.4 69.7 70.4
Conditional on Participation...
Mean usual hours/week in regular sector 43.4 48.1 46.7 47.7
Mean annual earnings in regular sector ($) 8,797 22,009 24,152 26,407
Participation Rates in Informal Sector
Any informal work 34.6 36.8 31.0 20.1
Oﬀ-the-books 25.6 24.9 22.0
Own business 7.8 10.2 6.1 9.5
Drug sales/Prostitution/Hustles 4.4 4.4 3.4 2.9
Other informal work 4.3 9.0 6.8 9.2
Conditional on Participation...
Mean usual hours/week in informal sector 24.9 33.2 26.4 24.5
Mean annual earnings in informal sector ($) 8,121 5,929 6,070
Single Women (n=2476) (n=2402) (n=2347)
Participation Rates in Regular Sector 51.2 55.1 58.6
Mean usual hours/week in regular sector 38.9 40.4 40.7
Mean annual earnings in regular sector ($) 13,498 17,393 19396
Participation Rates in Informal Sector
Any informal work 15.8 16.0 11.6
Oﬀ-the-books 8.6 8.7
Own business 3.7 3.3 4.7
Drug sales/Prostitution/Hustles 0.5 0.9 0.7
Other informal work 5.4 5.4 6.9
Conditional on Participation...
Mean usual hours/week in informal sector 23.4 20.3 16.0
Mean annual earnings in informal sector ($) 2,980 2,520 2,398
Sample restricted to respondents unmarried at baseline and in all subsequent waves. In wave
4, the survey asked about only three types of informal work. In wave 1, mothers were not
surveyed about informal work and the survey only collected categorical information about
men’s annual earnings from informal work.
32Table 2: EITC Claims by Gender and Marital Status (2005 SOI Data)
Gender and Number of Percent Percent
Marital Children Number of of EITC Average of EITC
Status Claimed Returns Returns Credit Expenditures
Overall All Returns 22.8 100.0 $1864 100.0
0 4.7 20.6 230 2.5
1 8.6 37.7 1779 36.0
2+ 9.4 41.2 2766 61.2
Single Men All Returns 6.0 26.3 1376 19.4
0 2.5 11.0
12 . 1 9 . 2
2+ 1.4 6.1
Single Women All Returns 11.5 50.4 2042 55.3
01 . 7 7 . 5
1 4.9 21.5
2+ 4.8 21.1
Married All Returns 5.3 23.2 1994 24.9
Source: Internal Revenue Service (2005). I thank Tim Dowd at the Joint
Committee on Taxation for tabulating these statistics by gender. The percent
of ﬁlers and percent of credit columns are calculated from the number of returns
and average credit and are subject to rounding error.
33Table 3: Changes in State Earned Income Tax Credits, 1997-2005
State Year(s) Credit Refundable? Notes
Illinois 2000-2005 5 As of 2003
Indiana 2003-2005 6 Yes Between 1999-2002, Indiana
had an earned income credit
that was not based on the fed-
eral credit.
Maryland 1997-2005 50 Partially 10% of the federal credit re-
fundable in 1998-1999, 15% in
2000, 16% for 2001-2002, 18%
for 2003, 20% for 2004-2005.
Massachusetts 1997-2001 10 Yes
2001-2005 15 Yes
New Jersey 2000 10 Yes Prior to 2007, only taxpayers
with an eligible child and










34Table 4: Fragile Families Summary Statistics at Five-Year Followup (Wave 4)
Men Women
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
State credit percent of federal credit 8.64 (15.28) 8.44 (15.11)
Has ﬁled/will ﬁle tax form for previous year 0.61 (0.49) 0.66 (0.47)
Filers: Claimed EITC on previous year’s taxes 0.38 (0.49) 0.74 (0.44)
Black, non-Hispanic 0.64 (0.48) 0.62 (0.48)
Hispanic 0.23 (0.42) 0.24 (0.43)
Less than high-school education 0.36 (0.48) 0.32 (0.47)
High-school degree, GED, or ABE 0.32 (0.47) 0.30 (0.46)
Some post-high-school education 0.28 (0.45) 0.31 (0.46)
4-year college degree 0.04 (0.19) 0.06 (0.25)
Age 29.1 (5.8) 28.9 (5.6)
Currently cohabiting with partner 0.53 (0.50) 0.42 (0.49)
At least one child lives in household 0.45 (0.50) 0.96 (0.2)
Number of children living in household 0.89 (1.23) 2.35 (1.37)
Ever spent time in jail 0.37 (0.48) 0.02 (0.14)
Has legal child support order 0.45 (0.50) 0.46 (0.50)
Worked in regular job in past 12 months 0.70 (0.46) 0.59 (0.49)
Hourly wage in current/most recent regular job 12.1 (6.9) 10.1 (5.2)
Weeks worked in regular job, past 12 months 31.8 (23.6) 25.9 (24.4)
Conditional on working in regular sector 45.9 (12.5) 45.0 (13.3)
Usual hours/week worked in regular sector 33.5 (25.6) 23.8 (22.5)
Conditional on working in regular sector 47.7 (16.1) 40.7 (13.5)
Annual hours worked in regular job 1541 (1297) 1075 (1123)
Conditional on working in regular sector 2223 (954) 1870 (841)
Household income 34646 (36458) 23709 (23872)
Professional/technical 0.04 (0.19) 0.07 (0.26)
Executive/admin/managerial 0.07 (0.25) 0.05 (0.21)
Sales 0.06 (0.24) 0.16 (0.37)
Administrative support 0.05 (0.21) 0.24 (0.43)
Precision production/craft/repair 0.20 (0.40) 0.01 (0.09)
Machine operator/assem/inspection 0.07 (0.26) 0.03 (0.18)
Transportation/material moving 0.11 (0.31) 0.01 (0.1)
Handler/equip cleaner/laborer 0.18 (0.39) 0.04 (0.19)
Service 0.22 (0.41) 0.39 (0.49)
Other/Unspeciﬁed 0.01 (0.09) 0.00 (0.00)
Sample restricted to individuals who are unmarried at baseline and in all subsequent
waves.
35Table 5: Fixed Eﬀects Regressions: Participation in the Informal Economy
Men Women
Refundable state percent of federal credit -0.003 -0.006* -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
State tax bracket rate -0.011 -0.076***
(0.043) (0.012)
Tax year after 2001 tax cut 0.083 -0.001
(0.072) (0.024)
State unemployment rate -0.049*** -0.026*
(0.015) (0.014)
State minimum wage 0.043 -0.030**
(0.051) (0.012)




Age squared/100 -0.005 0.041
(0.020) (0.026)
Less than high-school education 0.019 0.051
(0.041) (0.057)
Some post-high-school education 0.080* -0.015
(0.040) (0.043)
4-year college degree -0.014 -0.104**
(0.151) (0.043)
Father currently cohabiting with partner 0.025 0.005
(0.015) (0.013)
Number of children living in household 0.006 -0.010*
(0.005) (0.005)
Hourly wage in most recent regular job -0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.001)
Father ever spent time in jail 0.082
(0.050)
Father has legal child support order 0.045*
(0.023)
Mother received TANF in last year 0.014
(0.024)
Constant 0.862*** 2.041*** 0.174 0.154
(0.172) (0.212) (0.174) (0.507)
R-squared 0.047 0.059 0.013 0.022
Number of Person-Year Observations 6451 5556 6747 5748
Number of Person Observations 2208 2086 2574 2428
All regressions include state, wave and year indicators and occupation codes. Robust
standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; **
signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
36Table 6: Fixed Eﬀects Regressions: Participation in the Regular Economy and Conditional




Regular if Regular Regular if Regular
Sector Sector > 0 Sector Sector > 0
Refundable state percent of federal credit 0.002 -0.009** 0.001 0.005
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
State tax bracket rate -0.020 0.016 0.029 -0.102***
(0.026) (0.060) (0.033) (0.021)
Tax year after 2001 tax cut -0.023 0.050 0.032 0.020
(0.037) (0.080) (0.019) (0.042)
State unemployment rate 0.008 -0.019 -0.003 -0.044**
(0.015) (0.014) (0.011) (0.019)
State minimum wage 0.003 0.082** -0.001 -0.053**
(0.015) (0.038) (0.019) (0.023)
State welfare beneﬁt for family of 3, $100s -0.011 -0.054 0.025 -0.032
(0.029) (0.044) (0.027) (0.020)
Age 0.011 0.023 0.060 -0.025
(0.013) (0.015) (0.036) (0.025)
Age squared/100 -0.019 -0.038** -0.068* 0.040
(0.018) (0.017) (0.034) (0.026)
Less than high-school education 0.007 0.017 -0.152** 0.105
(0.055) (0.076) (0.056) (0.090)
Some post-high-school education 0.035 0.075 -0.007 0.060
(0.040) (0.076) (0.065) (0.057)
4-year college degree 0.055 -0.111 0.017 -0.023
(0.095) (0.214) (0.093) (0.054)
Father currently cohabiting with partner 0.024 0.030 -0.017 -0.012
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020)
Number of children living in household 0.007 -0.005 0.016** -0.010
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.012)
Hourly wage in most recent regular job 0.003*** -0.003* 0.003* -0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Father ever spent time in jail -0.158*** 0.029
(0.041) (0.089)
Father has legal child support order -0.026 0.054***
(0.018) (0.018)
Mother received TANF in last year -0.212*** -0.041
(0.018) (0.027)
Constant -0.574* 1.461*** -0.339 0.710
(0.306) (0.359) (0.955) (0.496)
R-squared 0.024 0.065 0.064 0.037
Number of Person-Year Observations 5616 4035 5759 3378
Number of Person Observations 2096 1774 2429 1832
All regressions include state, wave, and year indicators and occupation codes. Robust standard errors
clustered at the state level are in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at
1%




Dependent variable EITC of federal credit
Fathers
Father has at least one child in household 0.004 0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Focal child lives with father at least half time 0.046*** 0.002
(0.016) (0.004)
Mothers
Mother has at least one child in household 0.002 0.001
(0.005) (0.001)
Focal child lives with mother at least half time 0.024** 0.001
(0.009) (0.001)
Additional variables are identical to those in Tables 5 and 6. Robust standard errors
clustered at the state level are in parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant
at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
Table 8: Family and Household Mean Diﬀerences by Tax Filing and EITC Claimant Status,
Fragile Families Wave 4
Men Women
Filed Claimed Filed Claimed
Diﬀerence in Means Taxes EITC Taxes EITC
Number of children in household 0.191*** 0.412*** -0.278*** 0.238***
(0.064) (0.082) (0.060) (0.075)
Pr(children in household) 0.147*** 0.202*** 0.050*** 0.010
(0.026) (0.034) (0.008) (0.009)
Number of biological children -0.523*** 0.053 -0.704*** 0.150*
(0.088) (0.107) (0.065) (0.080)
Pr(child lives with parent at least half time) 0.149*** 0.139*** 0.051*** 0.007
(0.026) (0.034) (0.007) (0.007)
N ≥ 1526 ≥ 870 ≥ 2335 ≥ 1468
Simple diﬀerences in means by tax ﬁling status and EITC claimant status.
38Table 9: Fixed Eﬀects OLS and Pooled Tobits: Usual Hours Worked Per Week in Informal
and Regular Sectors
Men Women
FE Tobit FE Tobit
Regular Sector 0.41*** 0.27*** -0.23 -0.22*
(0.09) (0.09) (0.15) (0.11)
Informal Sector, if Regular Sector > 0 -0.27** -0.19 0.01 0.01
(0.12) (0.16) (0.07) (0.05)
Total Hours, if Regular Sector > 0 0.12 0.09 -0.31 -0.28*
(0.18) (0.16) (0.22) (0.16)
Additional variables are identical to those in Tables 5 and 6. Tobit results are
presented as marginal eﬀects on the observed outcome evaluated at the mean for
continuous variables and eﬀects of discrete changes from 0 to 1 for binary variables.
Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are in parentheses. * signiﬁcant
at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
Table 10: Hurdle Model: Marginal Eﬀects for Participation and Hours Worked in Informal
and Regular Sectors
Men Women
Probit Truncated Probit Truncated
(Participation) (Hours) (Participation) (Hours)
Regular Sector 0.002 0.22*** -0.002 -0.25*
(0.002) (0.05) (.002) (0.14)
Informal Sector, if -0.006 -0.67 0.001 -1.15
Regular Sector > 0 (0.005) (1.39) (0.002) (2.47)
Probit results are reported as mean marginal eﬀects. Results from truncated regressions
are reported as marginal eﬀects evaluated at the mean. Additional variables are identical
to those in Tables 5 and 6. Sample restricted to observations for which participation
and hours are both observed. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are in
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































40Table 12: Fixed Eﬀects Regressions: State EITCs and Men’s Tax Filing Behavior
Filed taxes Claimed EITC
State has additional EITC -0.024 0.093***
(0.020) (0.026)
n = 3849 n = 2362
State has additional refundable EITC -0.093 0.010
(0.062) (0.086)
n = 3850 n = 2362
State has additional refundable EITC -0.025 0.087***
(excluding Illinois) (0.021) (0.025)
n = 3771 n = 2310
Men who plan to ﬁle taxes for the past year but have not yet ﬁled are excluded from
the “Claimed EITC” regressions because they are not asked about EITC status.
Additional variables are identical to those in Tables 5 and 6. Robust standard errors
clustered at the state level are in parentheses. Numbers of person-year observations
are shown below the standard errors. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%;
*** signiﬁcant at 1%
Table 13: State EITC Phase-in Rates and Men’s State Aggregate Labor Supply
Unweighted Weighted
Coeﬃcient Coeﬃcient
(Standard Error) (Standard Error)
Participation Rate in Regular Sector 0.001 -0.000
(0.009) (0.001)
Participation Rate in Informal Sector -0.009 -0.011**
(0.011) (0.005)
Average Hours Worked/Week in Regular Sector 0.515 0.395**
(0.440) (0.149)
Average Hours Worked/Week in Informal Sector 0.010 -0.226**
(0.095) (0.097)
Dependent variable is mean of labor supply variables in each state-year. Independent
variable is state refundable EITC phase-in rate. No controls are included. States are the
15 states in which interviews were conducted at baseline. In the weighted regressions,
weights depend on the number of observations in each state-year cell and the sum of
the weights is normalized to the sum of the observations (62). Robust standard errors
clustered at the state level are in parentheses.* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%
41